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Abstract
This paper examines the tax schedule for low income families with children.
We take an optimal tax approach based on a structural labour supply model
which incorporates unobserved heterogeneity, ﬁxed costs of work, childcare
costs and the detailed non-convexities of the tax and transfer system. The
motivation is the British earned income tax credit reform (WFTC) and its
interaction with the tax and transfer system for lone parents. Our analysis
also examines the case for the use of hours-contingent payments. The results
point to a tax schedule which depends on the age of children, with tax credits
only optimal for low earners with school age children. The results also suggest a
welfare improving role for hours-contingent payments although this is mitigated
when hours cannot be monitored or recorded accurately by the tax authorities.
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11 Introduction
The empirical analysis of labour supply behaviour has strong implications for the
design of earnings taxation. Our aim here is to use a microeconometric labour supply
model to assess the design of tax rate reforms for the low paid. In particular, to
examine policies that aim at reducing the eﬀective tax rates on work for low income
families, as in the signiﬁcant expansions of earned income tax credits in the UK and
the US.1
Tax credit reforms have been evaluated extensively in the UK and elsewhere.
The evidence that tax credit policies encourage work is compelling and the positive
impact on employment has been found to be particularly strong for single mothers, see
for example Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Blundell et al. (2000). These and other
studies tell us about the labour supply impact of tax credit reforms. Given that such
labour supply responses also help us to learn about preferences, it is possible to move
beyond the evaluation of particular reforms, and consider problems related to the
optimal design of the tax and transfer system. In the spirit of Mirrlees (1971), we
shall ask: how should the government best allocate a ﬁxed amount of revenue to the
design of earnings taxation?
The analysis draws on the microeconometric and the optimal taxation literature.
In the microeconometric literature certain common and robust features of estimated
labour supply responses of the low paid have emerged. Speciﬁcally, the importance
of distinguishing between the intensive margin of hours of work and the extensive
margin where the work decision is made. Labour supply elasticities appear to be
much larger at the extensive margin, at least for certain household demographic
types, see Blundell and Macurdy (1999).
The optimal taxation literature explores consequences for design. In parallel with
the empirical regularities, the literature on the design of tax and transfer systems has
increasingly focussed on the extensive margin and the use of work conditions, see for
1See Blundell and Hoynes (2004), for example.
2example Beaudry et al. (2008), Besley and Coate (1992), Chon´ e and Laroque (2005),
Laroque (2005), Moﬃtt (2006), Phelps (1994) and Saez (2001, 2002). Our approach
is closest to that by Saez (2002) who, building on earlier work by Diamond (1980),
examines the optimality of tax credit designs within a Mirrlees framework but one
which acknowledges the distinction between the extensive margin and intensive mar-
gin of labour supply. Indeed, Saez (2002) derives approximate optimal tax formula in
terms of representative labour supply elasticities at the extensive and intensive mar-
gin. Recently, Immervoll et al. (2007) implement this approach and suggest that for
reasonable welfare weights, tax credits would be an optimal policy across a wide set
of economies. As part of the Mirrlees Review, Brewer et al. (2009) use this approach
to explore the taxation of families in the UK.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we take the structural model
of employment and hours of work seriously in designing the structure of taxes and
transfers, allowing the distribution of earnings, ﬁxed costs of work and demographic
diﬀerences to inﬂuence the design of tax policy. Second, we consider the case where
hours of work are partially observable to the tax authorities and consider the case
for hours contingent reforms. Third, we assess the role of conditioning on the age of
children in the rate schedule for earnings taxation.
Our exploration of hours contingent reforms is motivated by the common use of
hours based eligibility in the tax credit systems of countries like the UK, Ireland
and New Zealand. Hours information is also used in the design of work condi-
tioned earnings supplements, for example in the Canadian Self-Suﬃciency Project
(Card and Robins, 1998) and in the TANF programme of welfare payment in the US
(Moﬃtt, 2003). It has also been proposed as a mechanism for improving tax design,
see Keane (1995), although not within an optimal tax framework. Given the likely
diﬃculties in recording and monitoring hours of work, our analysis also considers
scenarios where hours are subject to measurement error, or where individuals may
directly misreporting their hours of work to the tax authorities.
The microeconometric analysis we follow is based on a stochastic discrete choice
3labour supply model (Hoynes, 1996; Keane and Moﬃtt, 1998; Blundell et al., 2000;
van Soest et al., 2002). This model allows for discrete choices over non-linear budget
constraints and ﬁxed costs of work to re-examine the optimal design problem. The
optimal tax model is then derived directly from the labour supply model together
with the estimated distribution of earnings, ﬁxed costs of work, childcare costs, de-
mographic diﬀerences and unobserved heterogeneity.2
The analysis is set in a static environment with ﬁxed costs of work and stigma
costs of accessing welfare beneﬁts. We are therefore ignoring dynamic eﬀects in both
labour supply choices and in the design of the tax structure. Our focus is on the
design of the tax schedule for low earners and the role of tax credits. Although
an experience pay-oﬀ in earnings would change the optimal structure, we think our
approach captures the most important aspects of design for this group. The evidence
points to relatively low or negligible experience eﬀects for low earnings single parents,
see Card and Hyslop (2005) and Gladden and Taber (2000). A more subtle dynamic
eﬀect may act through fertility decisions. Keane and Wolpin (2007) note that fertility
eﬀects may largely counteract the direct impact on labour supply. However, the eﬀect
of tax reform on fertility behaviour is generally found to be signiﬁcant but small,
see Hoynes (2009). A further key dynamic aspect of tax design is the interaction
with savings taxation and the taxation of lifetime income. In certain circumstances,
the taxation of saving can be used to relax the incentive compatibility constraint
on earnings taxation (see Banks and Diamond, 2009). However, with ﬁxed costs of
work, credit constraints and earnings uncertainty there is likely to remain a strong
role for nonlinear earnings tax design of the type described here.
The results of our analysis point to marginal tax rates that are broadly increasing
in earnings, and that are lower than under the current UK system. Moreover, we show
that heterogeneity is important. In particular, we present a case for pure tax credits
at low earnings but only for mothers with school aged children. It is also found that
2An alternative model which incorporates constraints on labour supply choices in an optimal
design problem is developed in Aaberge and Colombino (2008).
4hours contingent payments can improve design. Indeed, if hours can be accurately
observed, we present an empirical case for using a full-time work rule rather than the
part-time rule currently in place for parents in the UK. While this is found to be a
more eﬀective instrument, the welfare gains remain modest in size for all but parents
with older children. These welfare gains are also shown to reduce signiﬁcantly with
moderate amounts of misreporting or measurement error.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop the analytical
framework for optimal design within a stochastic structural labour supply model. In
section 3 we outline the WFTC reform in the UK and its impact on work incentives.
Section 4 outlines the structural microeconometric model, while in section 5 we de-
scribe the data and model estimates. Section 6 uses these model estimates to derive
optimal tax schedules. We provide evidence for lowering the marginal rates at lower
incomes and also document the importance of allowing the tax schedule to depend
on the age of children. We also discuss how introducing hours rules aﬀects tax credit
design, and how important these are likely to be in terms of social welfare. Finally,
section 7 concludes.
2 The Optimal Design Problem
The policy analysis here concerns the choice of a tax schedule in which the government
is attempting to allocate a ﬁxed amount of revenue R to a speciﬁc demographic group
– single mothers – in a way which will maximise the social welfare for this group.
Such a schedule balances redistributive objectives with eﬃciency considerations. Re-
distributive preferences are represented through the social welfare function deﬁned
as the sum of transformed individual utilities, where the choice of transformation
reﬂects the desire for equality.
In this section we develop an analytical framework for the design of tax and
transfer policy that allows for two scenarios. In the ﬁrst only earnings are observable
by the tax authority, in the second we allow for partial observability of hours of
5work. Rather than assuming that individuals are unconstrained in their choice of
hours, we suppose that only a ﬁnite number of hours choices are available, with
hours of work h chosen from the ﬁnite set H = {h0,...hJ}. The formulation of the
optimal tax design problem will depend upon what information is observable to the
tax authorities. We always assume that the government can observe earnings wh
and worker characteristics X, and we shall also allow for the possibility of observing
some hours of work information. In much of our analysis we will assume that rather
than necessarily observing the actual hours h that are chosen, the tax authorities is
assumed to only be able to observe that they belong to some closed interval h =
[h,h] ∈ H with h ≤ h ≤ h. For example, the tax authorities may be able to
observe whether individuals are working at least hB hours per week, but conditional
on this, not how many. Depending on the size of the interval, this framework nests
two important special cases; (i) when hours are perfectly observable h = h = h
for all h ∈ H; (ii) only earnings information is observed h = H++ for all h > 0.
In general this is viewed as a problem of partial observability since actual hours h
are always contained in the interval h. In our later analysis in section 6.3 we will
explore the eﬀect that both random hours measurement error, and possible direct
hours misreporting have upon the optimal design problem.
Work decisions by individuals are determined by their preferences over consump-
tion c and labour hours h, as well as possible childcare requirements, ﬁxed costs
of work, and the tax and transfer system. Preferences are indexed by observable
characteristics X, including the number and age of her children, and vectors of un-
observable (to the econometrician) characteristics ǫ and ε; the distinction between
these vectors will be made in section 4. We let U(c,h;X,ǫ,ε) represent the utility
of a single mother who consumes c and works h hours. We will assume that she
consumes her net income which comprises the product of hours of work h and the
gross hourly wage w plus non-labour income and transfer payments, less taxes paid,
childcare expenditure, and ﬁxed costs of work. In what follows we let F denote the
6distribution of state speciﬁc errors ε, and G denote the joint distribution of (X,ǫ).3
In our later empirical analysis individual utilities U(c,h;X,ǫ,ε) will be described
by a parametric utility function and a parametric distribution of unobserved hetero-
geneity (ǫ,ε). Similarly, a parametric form will be assumed for the stochastic process
determining ﬁxed costs of work and childcare expenditure. To maintain focus on the
optimal design problem, we delay this discussion regarding the econometric modelling
until section 4; for now it suﬃces to write consumption c at hours h as c(h;T,X,ǫ),4
where T(wh,h;X) represents the tax and transfer system. Non-labour income, such
as child maintenance payments, enter the tax and transfer schedule T through the
set of demographics X, and for notational simplicity we abstract from the poten-
tial dependence of the tax and transfer system on childcare expenditure. Taking
the schedule T as given, each single mother is assumed to choose her hours of work
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where for a given cardinal representation of U, the utility transformation function
Υ determines the governments relative preference for the equality of utilities.5 This
maximization is subject to the incentive compatibility constraint which states that








∗;X)dF(ε)dG(X,ǫ) ≥ T(≡ −R). (3)
3Throughout our analysis we assume that ε is independent of both ǫ and X.
4The assumptions that we later make regarding the error term ε ensure that consumption will
not depend on ε for given work hours h.
5Given the presence of preference heterogeneity, a more general formulation would allow the
utility transformation function Υ to vary with individual characteristics.
7In our empirical application we will restrict T to belong to a particular parametric
class of tax functions. This is discussed in section 6 when we examine the optimal
design of the tax and transfer schedule.
3 Tax Credit Reform
The increasing reliance on tax-credit policies during the 1980s and 1990s, especially
in the UK and the US, reﬂected the secular decline in the relative wages of low skilled
workers with low labour market attachment together with the growth in single-parent
households (see Blundell, 2002, and references therein). The speciﬁc policy context
for this paper is the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) reform which took place
in the UK at the end of 1999. A novel feature of the British tax credit system is that
it makes use of hours conditions in addition to an earnings condition. Speciﬁcally
WFTC eligibility required a working parent to record at least 16 hours of work per
week. Moreover there was a further hours contingent bonus for working 30 hours or
more.
As in the US, the UK has a long history of in-work beneﬁts, starting with the
introduction Family Income Support (FIS) in 1971. Over the years, these programmes
became more generous, and in October 1999, Working Families’ Tax Credit was
introduced, replacing a similar, but less generous, tax credit programme called Family
Credit (see Blundell et al., 2008, for example). As noted above, an important feature
of British programmes of in-work support since their inception – and in contrast
with programmes such as the US Earned Income Tax Credit – is that awards depend
not only on earned and unearned income and family characteristics, but also on a
minimum weekly hours of work requirement. In April 1992, the minimum hours
requirement fell from 24 to 16 hours a week. The impact of this reform on single
parents’ labour supply is ambiguous: those working more than 16 hours a week had
an incentive to reduce their hours to (no less than) 16, while those previously working
fewer than 16 hours had an incentive to increase their labour supply to (at least) the
8new cut-oﬀ. Figure 1 shows that the pattern of observed hours of work over this period
strongly reﬂects these incentives. Single women without children were ineligible.6
The tax design problem we discuss here relates directly to the features of the
WFTC. Indeed we assess the reliability of our labour supply model in terms of its
ability to explain behaviour before and after the reform. There were essentially ﬁve
ways in which WFTC increased the level of in-work support relative to the previous
FC system: (i) it oﬀered higher credits, especially for families with younger children;
(ii) the increase in the threshold meant that families could earn more before it was
phased out; (iii) the tax credit withdrawal rate was reduced from 70% to 55%; (iv) it
provided more support for formal childcare costs through a new childcare credit; (v)
all child maintenance payments were disregarded from income when calculating tax
credit entitlement. The main parameters of FC and WFTC are presented in Table 1.
The WFTC reform increased the attractiveness of working 16 or more hours a
week compared to working fewer hours, and the largest potential beneﬁciaries of
WFTC were those families who were just at the end of the FC beneﬁt withdrawal
taper. Conditional on working 16 or more hours, the theoretical impact of WFTC
is as follows: (i) people receiving the maximum FC award will face an income eﬀect
away from work, but not below 16 hours a week; (ii) people working more than 16
hours and not on maximum FC will face an income eﬀect away from work (but not
below 16 hours a week), and a substitution eﬀect towards work; (iii) people working
more than 16 hours and earning too much to be entitled to FC but not WFTC
will face income and substitution eﬀects away from work if they claim WFTC (see
Blundell and Hoynes, 2004).
When analyzing the eﬀect of the WFTC programme it is necessary to take an
integrated view of the tax system. This is because tax credit awards are counted as
income when calculating entitlements to other beneﬁts, such as Housing Beneﬁt and
Council Tax Beneﬁt. Families in receipt of such beneﬁts would gain less from the
6In 1995, there was another reform to Family Credit, in the form of an additional (smaller) credit
for those adults working full time (deﬁned as 30 or more hours a week).
9WFTC reform than otherwise equivalent families not receiving these beneﬁts; Figure
2 illustrates how the various policies impact on the budget constraint for a low wage
lone parent. Moreover, there were other important changes to the tax system aﬀecting
families with children that coincided with the expansion of tax credits, and which
make the potential labour supply responses considerably more complex. In particular,
there were increases in the generosity of Child Beneﬁt (a cash beneﬁt available to all
families with children regardless of income), as well as notable increases in the child
additions in Income Support (a welfare beneﬁt for low income families working less
than 16 hours a week).7
4 A Structural Labour Supply Model
The labour supply speciﬁcation develops from earlier studies of structural labour sup-
ply that use discrete choice techniques and incorporate non-participation in transfer
programmes, speciﬁcally Hoynes (1996) and Keane and Moﬃtt (1998). Our aim is
to construct a credible model of labour supply behaviour that adequately allows for
individual heterogeneity in preferences and can well describe observed labour market
outcomes. As initially discussed in section 2, lone mothers have preferences deﬁned
over consumption c and hours of work h. Hours of work h are chosen from some
ﬁnite set H, which in our empirical application will correspond to the discrete weekly
hours points H = {0,10,19,26,33,40}.8 We augment the model discussed in section
2 to allow the take-up of tax-credits to have a direct impact on preferences through
the presence of some stigma or hassle cost (discussed further below), and we use P
(equal to one if tax credits are received, zero otherwise) to denote the endogenous
7For many families with children, these increases in out-of-work income meant that, despite
the increased generosity of in-work tax credits, replacement rates remained relatively stable. There
were also changes to the tax system that aﬀected families both with and without dependent children
during the lifetime of WFTC: a new 10% starting rate of income tax was introduced; the basic rate
of income tax was reduced from 23% to 22%; there was a real rise in the point at which National
Insurance (payroll tax) becomes payable.
8These hours points correspond to the empirical hours ranges 0, 1–15, 16–22, 23–29, 30–36 and
37+ respectively.
10programme participation decision.9 These preferences may vary with observable de-
mographic characteristics X (such as age, region, the number and age of children),
and vectors of unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics ǫ and ε. Here ε
is used speciﬁcally to denote the additive state speciﬁc errors which are attached to
each discrete hours point and are assumed to follow a standard Type-I extreme value
distribution so that:
U(c,h,P;X,ǫ,ε) = u(c,h,P;X,ǫ) + εh.
While we will later consider alternative preference speciﬁcations, our results will










(1 − h/H)θl − 1
θl
− Pη(X,ǫ) (4)
where H = 168 denotes the total weekly time endowment, and where the set of
functions αy(X,ǫ), αl(X,ǫ), αyl(X) and η(X,ǫ) capture observed and unobserved
preference heterogeneity. The function η(X,ǫ) is included to reﬂect the possible
disutility associated with claiming in-work tax credits (P = 1), and its presence allows
us to rationalize less then complete take-up of tax credit programmes. In each case
we allow observed and unobserved heterogeneity to inﬂuence the preference shifter
functions through appropriate index restrictions. We assume that αyl(X) = X′
ylβyl,
logαy(X,ǫ) = X′
yβy + ǫy and logαl(X,ǫ) = X′
lβl + ǫl, with programme participation
costs also assumed to be linear in parameters, η(X,ǫ) = X′
ηβη+ǫη. We do not impose
concavity on the utility function.
The choice of hours of work h aﬀects consumption c through two main channels:
ﬁrstly, through its direct eﬀect on labour market earnings and its interactions with
the tax and transfer system; secondly, working mothers may be required to purchase
childcare for their children which varies with maternal hours of employment. Given
the rather limited information that our data contains on the types of childcare use,
9All other transfer programmes are assumed to have complete take-up.
11we take a similarly limited approach to modelling, whereby hours of childcare use
hc is essentially viewed as a constraint: working mothers are required to purchase a
minimum level of childcare hc ≥ αc(h,X,ǫ) which varies stochastically with hours of
work and demographic characteristics. Since we observe a mass of working mothers
across the hours of work distribution who do not use any childcare, a linear relation-
ship (as in Blundell et al., 2000) is unlikely to be appropriate. Instead, we assume
the presence of some underlying latent variable that governs both the selection mech-
anism and the value of required childcare itself. More speciﬁcally, we assume that
the total childcare hours constraint is given by:
αc(h,X,ǫ) = 1(h > 0) × 1(ǫcX > −βcXh − γcX) × (γcX + βcXh + ǫcX) (5)
where 1(·) is the indicator function, and where the explicit conditioning of the pa-
rameters and the unobservables on demographic characteristics X reﬂects the speci-
ﬁcation we adopt in our estimation, where we allow the parameters of this stochastic
relationship to vary with a subset of observable characteristics Xc (speciﬁcally, the
number and age composition of children). Total weekly childcare expenditure is then
given by pchc with pc denoting the hourly price of childcare. Empirically, we observe
a large amount of dispersion in childcare prices, with this distribution varying sys-
tematically with the age composition of children. This is modelled by assuming that
pc follows some distribution pc ∼ Fc(·;Xc) which again varies with demographic char-
acteristics. We approximate this distribution by discretizing the empirical childcare
price distribution including zero price and conditional on Xc.
Individuals are assumed to face a budget constraint, determined by a ﬁxed gross
hourly wage rate (assumed to be generated by a log-linear relationship of the form
logw = X′
wβw+ǫw) and the tax and transfer system. We arrive at our measure of con-
sumption by subtracting both childcare expenditure pchc (which also interacts with
the tax and transfer system) and ﬁxed work-related costs from net-income. These
ﬁxed work-related costs help provide a potentially important wedge that separates
the intensive and extensive margin. They reﬂect the actual and psychological costs
12that an individual has to pay to get to work. We model work-related costs as a ﬁxed,
one-oﬀ, weekly cost subtracted from net income at positive values of working time:
f = αf(h;X,ǫ) = 1(h > 0) × (X′
fβf + ǫf). It then follows that consumption at a
given hours and programme participation choice is given by:
c(h,P;T,X,ǫ) = wh − T(wh,h,P;X) − pchc − f (6)
where non-labour income, such as child maintenance payments, enter the tax and
transfer schedule T through the set of demographic characteristics X, and with the
explicit conditioning of T on childcare expenditure suppressed for notational simplic-
ity.
In order to fully describe the utility maximization problem of lone mothers, we
denote P ∗(h) ∈ {0,E(h;X,ǫ)} as the optimal choice of programme participation for
given hours of work h, where E(h;X,ǫ) = 1 if the individual is eligible to receive
tax credits at hours h, and zero otherwise. Assuming eligibility, it then follows that
P ∗(h) = 1 if and only if the following condition holds:
u(c(h,P = 1;T,X,ǫ),h,P = 1;X,ǫ) ≥ u(c(h,P = 0;T,X,ǫ),h,P = 0;X,ǫ) (7)
where c(h,P;X,ǫ) is as deﬁned in equation 6. It then follows that the optimal choice
of hours h∗ ∈ H maximizes U(c(h,P ∗(h);T,X,ǫ),h,P ∗(h);X,ǫ,ε) subject to the
constraints as detailed above.
5 Data and Estimation
5.1 Data
We use six repeated cross-sections from the Family Resources Survey (FRS), from the
ﬁnancial year 1997/8 through to 2002/3, which covers the introduction and subse-
quent expansion of WFTC. The FRS is a cross-section household-based survey drawn
from postcode records across Great Britain: around 30,000 families with and with-
out children each year are asked detailed questions about earnings, other forms of
13income and receipt of state beneﬁts. Our sample is restricted to lone mothers who
are aged between 18 and 45 at the interview date, not residing in a multiple tax unit
household, and not in receipt of any disability related beneﬁts. Dropping families
with missing observations of crucial variables, and those observed during the WFTC
phase-in period of October 1999 to March 2000 inclusive, restricts our estimation
sample to 7,110 lone mothers.
5.2 Estimation
The full model (preferences, wages, and childcare) is estimated simultaneously by
simulated maximum likelihood; the likelihood function is presented in Appendix A.10
We incorporate highly detailed representations of the tax and transfer system using
FORTAX (Shephard, 2009). The budget constraints vary accurately with individual
circumstances, and reﬂect the complex interactions between the many components of
the tax and transfer system. To facilitate the estimation procedure, the actual tax
and transfer schedules are modiﬁed slightly to ensure that there are no discontinuities
in net-income as either the gross wage or child care expenditure vary for given hours
of work. We do not attempt to describe the full UK system here, but the interested
reader may consult Adam and Browne (2009) and O’Dea et al. (2007) for recent sur-
veys; see Shephard (2009) for a discussion of the implementation of the UK system
in FORTAX.
For the purpose of modelling childcare, we deﬁne six groups by the age of youngest
child (0–4, 5–10, and 11–18) and by the number of children (1 and 2 or more).
The stochastic relationship determining hours of required childcare αc(h,X,ǫ) varies
within each of these groups, as does the child care price distribution Fc(·;Xc). Using
10This simultaneous estimation procedure contrasts with existing UK-centric labour supply studies
that have used discrete choice techniques. Perhaps largely owing to the complexity of the UK
transfer system, these existing studies (such as Blundell et al., 2000) typically pre-estimate wages
which allows net-incomes to be computed prior to the main preference estimation. In addition to
the usual eﬃciency arguments, the simultaneous estimation here imposes internal coherency with
regards to the various selection mechanisms.
14data from the entire sample period, the childcare price distribution is discretized into
either four price points (if the youngest child is aged 0–4 or 5–10) or 2 points (if the
youngest child is aged 11-18). In each case, the zero price point is included, and the
probability that lone mothers face each of these discrete price points is estimated.
The unobserved wage component ǫw and the random preference heterogeneity
terms (ǫy,ǫl,ǫf,ǫη,ǫcX) are assumed to be normally distributed. Given the diﬃculty in
identifying ﬂexible correlation structures from observed outcomes (see Keane, 1992),
we allow ǫy to be correlated with ǫw, but otherwise assume that the errors are inde-
pendent. In the later results presented we additionally restrict the standard deviation
of both ǫl and ǫf to be zero as we found them to be both very small in magnitude and
imprecisely estimated. The integrals over ǫ in the log-likelihood function are approx-
imated using simulation methods (see Train, 2003); we use 400 quasi-random draws
generated using Neiderreiter’s method. The model is estimated using a sequential
quadratic programming method.
5.3 Speciﬁcation and Structural Parameter Estimates
The estimates of the parameters of our structural model are presented in Table 12.
The age of the youngest child has a signiﬁcant impact on the estimated ﬁxed costs of
work αf; ﬁxed work related costs are higher by around £15 per week if the youngest
child is of pre-school age. The presence of young children also has a highly signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the interacted leisure-consumption parameter αyl, but does not have any
quantitatively large or signiﬁcant eﬀect on the linear preference terms αy and αl.
Whilst the age of the youngest child is important, the actual number of children does
not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect upon the preference parameters.
Lone mothers who are older are estimated to have a lower preference for both
consumption and leisure, but higher costs of claiming in-work support. Meanwhile,
the main impact of education comes primarily on the preference for leisure αl; moth-
ers who have completed compulsory schooling have a lower preference for leisure.
Ethnicity enters the model through both ﬁxed costs of work and programme partici-
15pation costs η; we ﬁnd that programme participation costs are signiﬁcantly higher for
non-white lone mothers. Programme participation costs are found to fall signiﬁcantly
following the introduction of WFTC, although the reduction in the ﬁrst year is small
(as captured by the inclusion of a variable equal to one in the ﬁrst year of WFTC).
Both the intercept γc and the slope coeﬃcient βc in the child care equation are
lower for those with older children. This reﬂects the fact that lone mothers with
older children use child care less, and that the total childcare required varies less
with maternal hours of work. To rationalize the observed distributions, we require
that the standard deviation σc is also larger for those with older children. The price
distribution of childcare for each group was discretized in such a way that amongst
those mothers using paid childcare, there are equal numbers in each discrete price
group. Our estimates attach greater probability on the relatively high childcare prices
(and less on zero price) than in our raw data. Individuals who do not work are
therefore more likely to face relatively expensive childcare were they to work.
The hourly log-wage equation includes years of education completed (which enters
positively), and both age and age squared (potential wages are increasing in age,
but at a diminishing rate). Lone mothers who reside in the Greater London area
have signiﬁcantly higher wages, and the inclusion of time dummies track the general
increase in real wages over time. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable dispersion in
the unobserved component of log-wages.
The within sample ﬁt of the model is presented in Tables 2 and 3. We match
the observed employment states and the take-up rate over the entire sample period
very well (see the ﬁrst column of Table 2). We slightly under predict the number
of lone mothers working 19 hours per week, and slightly over predict the number
working either 26 or 33 hours per week, but the diﬀerence is not quantitatively large.
Similarly, we obtain very good ﬁt by age of youngest child. The ﬁt to the employment
rate is particularly good, and the diﬀerence between predicted and empirical hours
frequencies never diﬀers by more than around two percentage points.
The ﬁt of the model over time is presented in Table 3. Fitting the model over
16time is more challenging given that time only enters our speciﬁcation in a very limited
manner - through the wage equation and via the change in the stigma costs of the
accessing the tax credit. Despite this we are able to replicate the 9 percentage point
increase in employment between 1997/98 and 2002/03 reasonably well with our model,
although we do slightly under predict the growth in part-time employment over this
period.
To understand what our parameter estimates mean for labour supply behaviour
we simulate labour supply elasticities under the actual 2002 tax system across a
range of earnings and household types. The results of this exercise are presented
in Table 5. Participation elasticities are lowest for single mothers whose youngest
child is under 4 (an elasticity of 0.57), while they are signiﬁcantly higher for mothers
with school aged children (0.82 if youngest child is aged 5-10; 0.72 if the youngest
child is aged 11-18). Across all child age groups, extensive elasticities are higher
than intensive elasticities at low earnings, but at higher earnings levels the intensive
elasticities dominate.11 Intensive elasticities are typically higher for lone mothers with
older children, as are the extensive elasticities except at low earnings levels; extensive
elasticities are very similar for lone mothers whose youngest child is aged 5-10 or aged
11-18. The individual behaviour that these summary elasticity measures reﬂect will
have implications for the optimal design of the tax and transfer system (see section
6).
5.4 Simulating the WFTC Reform
Before we proceed to consider optimal design problems using our structural model,
we ﬁrst provide an evaluation of the impact of the WFTC reform discussed in section
3 above on single mothers. This exercise considers the impact of replacing the actual
2002 tax systems with the April 1997 tax system on the 2002 population. This
exercise is slightly diﬀerent to simply examining the change in predicted states over
this time period as it removes the inﬂuence of changing demographic characteristics.
11See the note accompanying Table 5 for a precise deﬁnition of these elasticities.
17The results of this policy reform simulation are presented in Table 4. Overall we
predict that employment increased by 4 percentage points as a result of these reforms,
with the increase due to movements into both part-time and full-time employment.
Comparing with Table 3 we ﬁnd the reform explains a little under half of the rise
in employment over this period. The predicted increase in take-up of tax credits is
also substantial, with this increase driven both by the changing entitlement and the
estimated reduction in programme participation costs.
6 The Optimal Design of the Tax and Transfer
Schedule
In this section we use our structural model to examine the design of the tax and
transfer schedule. We show the importance of allowing the schedule to depend on the
age of children. One of the key results is that marginal rates should be lower for low
earnings families with older children. Given the use of a minimum hours condition
for eligibility in the British tax credit system, we also consider the design in the case
of a minimum hours rule. We show that if hours of work are partially (but otherwise
accurately) observable, then there can be non-trivial welfare gains from introducing
an hours rule for lone mothers with older children. However, accurately observing
hours of work is crucial for this result. Our results suggest that if hours of work are
subject to measurement error – whether this be random or due to direct misreporting
– then the welfare gains that can be realised may be much reduced. Our analysis here
therefore supports the informal discussion regarding the inclusion of hours in the tax
base in Banks and Diamond (2009). Before detailing these results, we ﬁrst turn to
the choice of social welfare transformation and the parameterisation of the tax and
transfer schedule.
186.1 Optimal Tax Speciﬁcation
We have shown that using parameter estimates from a structural model of labour
supply, the behaviour of individuals can be simulated as the tax and transfer system is
varied. With these heterogeneous labour supply responses allowed for, the structural
model provides all the necessary information to maximise an arbitrary social welfare
function, subject to a government budget constraint. Note that our analysis here
integrates that tax and transfer system.
To implement the optimal design analysis we approximate the underlying non-
parametric optimal schedule by a piecewise linear tax schedule that is characterized
by a level of out-of-work income (income support), and seven diﬀerent marginal tax
rates. These marginal tax rates, which are restricted to lie between -100% and 100%,
apply to weekly earnings from £0 to £300 in increments of £50, and then all weekly
earnings above £300. We do not tax any non-labour sources of income, and do
not allow childcare usage to interact with tax and transfer schedule unless explicitly
stated. When we later allow for partial observability of hours we introduce additional
payments that are received only if the individual fulﬁlls the relevant hours criteria.
The optimal tax schedule is solved separately for three diﬀerent groups on the basis
of the age of youngest child: under 4, aged 5 to 10 and 11 to 18. For these illustrations,
we have also conditioned upon the presence of a single child. For each of these groups
we set the value of government expenditure equal to the predicted expenditure on this
group within our sample.12 Conditioning upon this level of expenditure we calculate
the tax and transfer schedule that maximizes social welfare in each of these groups.





which controls the preference for equality by the one dimensional parameter θ and
also permits negative utilities which is important in our analysis given that the state
12To date we have made no attempt to calculate what the optimal division of overall expenditure
is between these three groups. This therefore makes an implicit assumption regarding the value that
the government attaches on the welfare of these groups.
19speciﬁc errors ε can span the entire real line. When θ is negative, the function (8)
favours the equality of utilities; when θ is positive the reverse is true. By L’Hˆ opital’s
rule θ = 0 corresponds to the linear case. We solve the schedule for a set of parameter
values θ = {−0.4,−0.2,0.0} and then derive the social weights that characterise these
redistributive preferences. We do not consider cases where θ > 0. The presence of
state speciﬁc Type-I extreme value errors, together with our above choice of utility
transformation has some particularly convenient properties, as the follow Proposition
now demonstrates.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the utility transformation function is as speciﬁed in
equation 8. If θ = 0 then conditional on X and ǫ the integral over (Type-I extreme








where γ ≈ 0.57721 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. If θ < 0 then conditional on X













where Γ is the gamma function.
Proof. The result for θ = 0 follows directly from an application of L’Hˆ opital’s rule,
and the well known result for expected utility in the presence of Type-I extreme value
errors (see McFadden, 1978). See Appendix B for a proof in the case where θ < 0.
This proposition, which essentially generalizes the result of McFadden (1978),
facilitates the numerical analysis as the integral over state speciﬁc errors does not
require simulating. Moreover, the relationship between the utilities in each state, and
the contribution to social welfare for given (X,ǫ) is made explicit and transparent.
206.2 Implications for the Tax Schedule
The underlying properties from the labour supply model, together with the choice of
social welfare weights, are the key ingredients in the empirical design problem. We
have seen from Table 5 that the intensive and extensive labour supply responses diﬀer
substantially. They also vary with the age of the youngest child. As expected this is
reﬂected in the optimal tax results. For the choice of utility transformation function
in equation 8 we examine the impact of alternative θ values. In Table 7 we present
the underlying social welfare weights evaluated at the optimal schedule (discussed
below) across the diﬀerent child age groups according to these alternative θ values.
For all three values of θ considered here the weights are broadly downward sloping.
For the most part we focus our discussion here on the -0.2 value, although we do
provide a sensitivity of our results to the choice of θ and ﬁnd the broad conclusions
are robust to this choice.
In Table 6 we present the optimal tax and transfer schedules across the alternative
θ values and for all child age groups (also see Figure 3(a)–(c) for θ = −0.2). In
all the simulations performed here, the structure of marginal tax rates is broadly
progressive with lower rates at lower earnings levels. In particular, marginal rates
are typically much lower in the ﬁrst tax bracket (earnings up to £50 per-week) and
for lone mothers with a child aged between 11 and 18 we obtain pure tax credits
(negative marginal tax rates) in this bracket. Marginal tax rates are typically much
higher in the second bracket (weekly earnings between £50 and £100), but then fall
before proceeding to generally increase with labour earnings. As we increase the value
of θ (corresponding to less redistributive concern), we obtain reductions in the value
of out-of-work income. This is accompanied by broad decreases in marginal tax rates,
except in the ﬁrst tax bracket where marginal tax rates increase. The social welfare
weights presented in Table 7 reﬂect these changes.
Our optimal tax simulations reveal some important diﬀerences by the age of chil-
dren. In particular, marginal tax rates tend to be higher at low earnings for lone
21mothers with younger children, but lower at high earnings. There are two important
observations to make here. Firstly, there are far fewer lone mothers with young chil-
dren who obtain high earnings under the respective optimal tax and transfer systems:
only around 25% of lone mothers whose child is aged 0–4 have earnings that exceed
£100 per week; in contrast, around 70% of lone mothers with children in the oldest
age group have earnings exceeding this amount. Secondly, the childcare requirements
of mothers with young children are considerably higher (see Table 12). As such, the
marginal rates presented in Table 6 understate the eﬀective marginal tax rates that
mothers with young children face. If we explicitly allow the tax system to subsidize
childcare expenditure (we consider a 70% subsidy, which corresponds to the formal
childcare subsidy rate under WFTC), then the level of out-of-work income remains
eﬀectively unchanged (since non-working mothers do not require childcare in our
structural model), while marginal tax rates increase across the entire distribution of
earnings for mothers with very young children. There are small increases for mothers
with children aged 5–10, and eﬀectively no change for mothers with children aged
11–18. Full results are available upon request.
In the simulation results in Table 6 we also present standard errors for the pa-
rameters of the optimal tax schedule. We obtain these by sampling 500 times from
the distribution of parameter estimates and re-solving for the optimal schedule con-
ditional on the sample distribution of covariates. The standard errors that we obtain
are typically quite small, but this does raise some concern that our results may be sen-
sitive to our particular speciﬁcation of the utility function. Before proceeding further,
we consider the robustness of our main results to the utility function parameteriza-
tion by estimating our labour supply model with diﬀerent preference representations,
and then exploring the implications for design under each of these. We consider two
alternative representations: (i) modify the utility function presented in equation 4 by
adding squared Box-Cox transformations of consumption and leisure (henceforth re-
ferred to as utility 2); (ii) preferences that are quadratic in leisure and consumption13
13That is: u(c,h,P;X,ǫ) = αyc2 + αll2 + αlycl + βyc + βll − Pη, with observable heterogeneity
22as in Blundell et al. (2000) (referred to as utility 3). The results of this robustness
exercise are presented in Table 8 in the case when θ = −0.2. Across all the diﬀerent
age groups, we ﬁnd that the schedules are very similar to those arrived at using our
original utility representation (referred to as utility 1 in the table). This therefore
suggests that the results we present are not too dependent upon our choice of utility
function.
6.3 Introducing an Hours Rule
For several decades the UK’s tax credits and welfare beneﬁts have made use of rules
related to weekly hours of work. As discussed in section 3, individuals must work at
least 16 hours a week to be eligible for in-work tax credits, and receive a further smaller
credit when working 30 or more hours. While many theoretical models rule out the
observability of any hours information, this design feature motivates us to explore
the optimal structure of the tax and transfer system when hours can be partially
observed as set out in section 2. We begin by assuming that the tax authority is
able to observe whether individuals are working 19 hours or more, which roughly
corresponds to the placement of the main 16 hours condition in the British tax-credit
system, and for now we do not allow for any form of measurement error. In this case
the tax authority is able to condition an additional payment on individuals working
such hours. When the tax authority is only able to observe earnings, it is unable to
infer whether an individual with a given level of earnings is low wage-high hours, or
high wage-low hours. Since the government may value redistribution more highly in
the former case, it may be able to better achieve its goals by introducing an hours
rule into the system.
The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 3(a)–(c) with θ = −0.2 and
assuming an hourly wage rate of £6 for all child age groups. The ﬁgures show that
the size of the hours bonus exhibits a very pronounced age gradient; we obtain a
X inﬂuencing the coeﬃcients through linear index restrictions, and with unobserved preference
heterogeneity ǫ entering the model similarly.
23weekly hours bonus equal to £23, £38 and £45 for lone mothers with children aged
0–4, 5–10 and 11–18 respectively.14 It therefore appears that there is a much smaller
requirement for a part-time hours bonus for families with children aged below 5. But
as the children age the optimal schedule changes quite dramatically with a strong
move towards an hours bonus.
Relative to the optimal system when such a rule is not implementable, the hours
bonus increases marginal rates in the part of the earnings distribution where this
hours rule would roughly come into eﬀect (particularly in the £50 to £100 earnings
bracket) while marginal rates further up the distribution, as well as the level of out-
of-work support, are essentially unchanged. As a result of this, some non-workers
with low potential wages may be induced to work part-time, while some low hours
individuals will either not work or increase their hours. Similarly, some high earnings
individuals will reduce their hours to that required for the bonus. The hours bonus is
suﬃciently large for lone mothers with school aged children, that it implies a negative
participation tax rate at 19 hours when earning the minimum wage rate.
Although there are some notable changes in the structure of the constraint when
hours information is partially observable (particularly for lone mothers with older
children), it does not follow that it necessarily leads to a large improvement in so-
cial welfare. Indeed, in the absence of the hours conditioning, there are only few
individuals working less than 19 hours (see Figure 4(a)–(c)) so the potential that it
oﬀers to improve social welfare appears limited. We now attempt to provide some
guidance concerning the size of the welfare gain from introducing hours rules. The
exact experiment we perform is as follows: we calculate the level of social welfare
under the optimal schedule with hours contingent payments, and then determine the
increase in expenditure per-person that is required to obtain the same level of social
welfare in the absence of such hours conditioning. In conducting this experiment we
14We also explore the impact that varying the redistributive taste parameter θ has on the size of
the hours bonus at 19 hours and on the overall structure of the budget constraint: when θ = −0.4
there is little change in the size of the bonus; when θ = 0.0 the optimal bonus is approximately
halved for all child age groups.
24allow all the parameters of the (earnings) tax schedule to vary so this is obtained at
least cost.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 9. Unsurprisingly, when chil-
dren are aged less than 5 the increased expenditure required to achieve the level of
social welfare obtained under the 19 hour rule is negligible. However, even when chil-
dren are of school age, the required increased expenditure is found to be small (and
is clearly negligible when the less redistributive preferences are considered). Even
without allowing for any form of measurement error, it follows that unless the costs
of partial hours observability is suﬃciently low, it would appear diﬃcult to advocate
the use of a 19 hour rule based upon this analysis. This has very important policy
implications given that the UK tax credit system makes heavy use of very similar
hours conditions.15
6.3.1 An Optimal Hours Rule?
The social welfare gains from introducing a 19 hours rule appear to be only very
modest in size at best. In this section we explore whether there are potentially larger
gains by allowing the choice of the point at which the hours rule becomes eﬀective
to be part of the optimal design problem. The optimal schedules with θ = −0.2 are
also shown in Figure 3(a)–(c). In all cases, we get an optimal hours rule at the ﬁfth
(out of six) discrete hours point, which corresponds to 33 hours per week.16 We also
note that the size of the optimally placed hours bonus always exceeds that calculated
15This ﬁnding contrasts with Keane and Moﬃtt (1998) which considered introducing a work sub-
sidy in a model with three employment states (non-workers, part-time and full-time work) and
multiple beneﬁt take-up. Even small subsidies were found to increase labour supply and to reduce
dependence on welfare beneﬁts. In contrast to our application (where we are moving from a base
with marginal rates well below 100% at low earnings), their simulations considered introducing
the subsidy in an environment where many workers faced marginal eﬀective tax rates which often
exceeded 100%.
16As was the case with the 19 hours rule, we ﬁnd that with θ = −0.4 there is essentially no change
in either the size or placement of the hours bonus. However, when θ = 0.0 we ﬁnd that the size of
the optimal bonus is approximately halved for all child age groups, whilst the optimal placement
shifts to 40 hours per-week.
25when the hours rule became eﬀective at 19 hours per week. The age gradient that
we observed previously is still preserved. Introducing an hours rule further up the
hours distribution allows the government to become more eﬀective in distinguishing
between high wage/low eﬀort and high eﬀort/low wage individuals than at 19 hours
to the extent that few higher wage individuals would choose to work very few hours.
Relative to the schedule when the hours rule is set at around 19 hours, this alternative
placement tends to make people with low and high earnings better oﬀ, while people
in the middle range lose. While we again ﬁnd that very little happens to the level of
out-of-work income, there are much more pronounced changes to the overall structure
of marginal rates. In particular, there are large reductions in the marginal tax rate
in the ﬁrst tax bracket for all groups (there is now a tax credit of −0.20 for lone
mothers with children aged 11–18, and −0.08 for lone mothers with children aged
5–10), while marginal rates now become higher at higher earnings (especially in the
presence of older children). Figure 4(a)–(c) show the resulting impact on the hours
distribution.
As before, we attempt to quantify the beneﬁts from allowing for hours condition-
ing. Performing the same experiment as we conducted under the 19 hours rule we ﬁnd
that the required increase in expenditure is considerably larger than that obtained
previously (again, see Table 9). For lone parents with children aged 11–18, an 8.5%
increase in expenditure would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare
when θ = −0.2. We believe that if hours can be accurately observed (as this analysis
so far assumes), then this represents a non-trivial welfare gain. For lone mothers
with younger children, the welfare gains are far more modest. In any case, if the
government wishes to maintain the use of hours conditional eligibility, the analysis
here suggests that it may be able to improve design by shifting towards a system that
primarily rewards full-time rather than part-time work.17
17We also considered alternative social welfare functions where the government places an explicit
weight on employment. In these simulations we obtained lower out-of-work income, together with
lower marginal tax rates at low earnings. However, such considerations did not have a large impact
on either the size or placement of the optimal hours bonus.
266.4 Measurement error and hours misreporting
The results presented so far have not allowed for any form of measurement error.
While earnings may not always be perfectly measured, it seems likely that there is
more scope for mismeasurement of hours as they are conceivably harder to monitor
and verify. Indeed, the presence of hours rules in the tax and transfer system presents
individuals with an incentive to not truthfully declare whether they satisfy the rel-
evant hours criteria. Relative to when hours are always accurately reported, this
would seem to weaken the case for introducing a measure of hours in the tax base.
In this section we quantify the importance of such measurement error by considering
two alternative scenarios: ﬁrstly, we consider the case where hours are imperfectly
observed due to random measurement error; secondly, we allow individuals to directly
misreport their hours of work to the tax authorities.
In performing this analysis it is necessary to modify our analytical framework
from section 2 to distinguish between actual hours of work h, and reported hours
of work hR. While actual hours continue to determine both leisure and earnings,
reported hours of work directly aﬀect consumption through the tax schedule, with
T = T(wh,hR;X). They will also have a direct impact on utility when we allow for
individual hours misreporting (discussed below).
6.4.1 Measurement error
We allow for random measurement error by adding an independent and normally
distributed error term ν to work hours h to form a pseudo reported hours measure,
˜ hR = h + ν. Actual reported hours hR are then given by the nearest discrete hours
point in the set of hours H++. We assume that ν has zero mean, and in Table 10
we show how the size of the hours bonus and the associated welfare gain, vary as
the standard deviation of the measurement error term σν increases in value. A clear
pattern emerges. Across all groups, the optimal size of the hours bonus declines as
reported hours become less informative. Furthermore, the placement of the optimal
hours rule is reduced from 33 to 26 hours for relatively high values of σν. In the
27simulations where the standard deviation of the error term is equal to 8 (so that a
single standard deviation results in reported hours diﬀering from actual hours by a
single category), the welfare gain from using hours information is more than halved
relative to no measurement error. The presence of random measurement error clearly
reduces the desirability of conditioning upon hours, and if it is modest or large in
size, then the welfare gains that are achievable are only small, even amongst lone
mothers with older children.
6.4.2 Hours misreporting
We have shown that random measurement error reduces the extent to which the
government may wish to condition upon hours of work, and it also diminishes the
welfare gains that are achievable. In the case of hours conditioning, it is plausible that
the form of misreporting is likely to be more systematic than random measurement
error. Here we modify our setup to allow individuals to directly misreport their
reported hours of work. We let hB be the required hours of work to receive a bonus
(received if h ≥ hB), and we continue to let hR denote reported hours of work.
Misreporting is only possible if h > 0, so that the tax authorities can always accurately
observe employment status. If individuals misreport their hours of work then they
must incur a utility cost, which is assumed to depend upon the distance hR−h. Since
misreporting hours is costly, it is only necessary to consider the cases when hours are
truthfully revealed hR = h, or when hR = hB > h.
We therefore modify the individual utility function by including hR − h as an
explicit argument, so that U = u(c,h,hR−h;X,ǫ)+εh. This modiﬁed utility function
is as in equation 4 but now with the additional cost term b × (hR − h) subtracted
from u whenever hR > h.18 If misreporting is not possible, then this is equivalent to
b = ∞. We do not allow individuals to manipulate their earnings wh. At a given
actual hours of work h < hB individuals will report their hours as hR = hB if and
18In practice misreporting costs are likely to vary with both observed and unobserved worker
characteristics. While it is suﬃcient to model this as a single cost for the purpose of our discussion
and simulations here, our framework can easily be extended to incorporate such heterogeneity.
28only if the utility gain exceeds the cost. That is:
u(c(h,T(wh,hB;X),X,ǫ),h,hB − h;X,ǫ) > u(c(h,T(wh,h;X),X,ǫ),h,0;X,ǫ).
We refer to the parameter b as the misreporting cost, and in the results presented
in Table 11 this is measured relative to the standard deviation of the state speciﬁc
error ε. With an hours bonus payable at 33 hours per week (for example), a value of
b = 0.16 would mean that the utility cost of reporting 33 hours when actual hours
are 26 is equivalent to a 0.16 × (33 − 26) = 1.12 standard deviation change in the
realisation of the state speciﬁc error. The table illustrates that as the utility cost of
misreporting becomes very low, the welfare gain from using reported hours of work
eﬀectively disappears (but the optimal placement remains at 33 hours for all values
considered). Again, this suggests that the welfare gains from using hours of work
information may be small unless the scope for misreporting hours of work is limited.
7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to examine the optimal schedule of marginal tax rates
and design of earned income tax credits. The context for this design problem has
been the tax and transfer schedule for lone parents in Britain. To address this tax
design problem we developed a structural labour supply model which incorporated
unobserved heterogeneity and the non-convexities of the tax and welfare system as
well as allowing for childcare costs and ﬁxed costs of work. We also explicitly allow
for diﬀerent labour supply responses at the intensive and extensive margins.
To mirror the hours contingent nature of the British tax credit system we devel-
oped an analytical framework that explicitly allowed for the tax authorities to have
partial observability of hours of work. We contrasted this to the standard case in
which only earnings (and employment) are revealed to the tax authority.
The structural labour supply model appeared reliable and the estimated model
suggested that lone parents with very young children are much less responsive to
changes in ﬁnancial work incentives than are lone parents with children of school age.
29This has implications for tax design. For those with very young children – where
the marginal value of leisure is high – the optimal policy design suggests it is better
to oﬀer high levels of income support together with higher marginal tax rates when
in work. In contrast, for those with school age children, where leisure is valued less
highly, the results suggest a move to a lower level of income support but also lower
marginal tax rates, increasing the incentives to work.
Our results highlight a role for conditioning eﬀective tax rates on the age of
children. Tax credits being found to be most important for low earning families
with school age children. Hours contingent payments, as feature in the British tax
credit system, are also found to lead to improvements in the tax design at least for
those parents with school age children. If the tax authorities are able to choose
the lower limit on working hours that trigger eligibility for such families, then we
ﬁnd an empirical case for using a full-time work rule rather than the part-time rule
currently in place for parents in the UK. While this is found to be a more eﬀective
instrument, the welfare gains remain modest in size for all but parents with older
children. These welfare gains are also shown to reduce signiﬁcantly with moderate
amounts of misreporting or measurement error.
30Appendix
A Likelihood function
In what follows let Pj(X,pck,ǫ) ≡ Pr(h = hj|X,pck,ǫ) denote the probability of
choosing hours hj ∈ H conditional on demographics X, the childcare price pck, and
the vector of unobserved preference heterogeneity ǫ = (ǫw,ǫcX,ǫy,ǫl,ǫf,ǫη). Given the
presence of state speciﬁc Type-I extreme value errors, this choice probability takes
the familiar conditional logit form. We also use πk(X) ≡ Pr(pc = pck|X) to denote
the probability of the lone mother with characteristics X facing childcare price pck.
In the case of non-workers (h = h0), neither wages nor childcare are observed so that







Now consider the case for workers when both wages and childcare information is
observed so that hc is not censored at zero. Using Eh ≡ E(h;X,pc,ǫ) to denote
eligibility for in-work support we deﬁne the indicator D(e,p) = 1(Eh = e,P = p). We
also let ∆u(hj|pck,X,ǫ|ǫη=0) denote the (possibly negative) utility gain from claiming
in-work support at hours hj, conditional on demographics X, the childcare price pck,
and the vector of unobserved preference heterogeneity ǫ with ǫη = 0. Suppressing the

































dG(ǫ|ǫw = logw − X
′
wβw,ǫc = hc − γcX − βcXh)
gw,c(logw − X
′
wβw,hc − γcX − βcXh).
31If working mothers are not observed using childcare, then hc is censored at zero
and the childcare price also unobserved. If ǫc = −γcX − βcXh, then the likelihood





































Our estimation also allows for workers with missing wages. This takes a similar form
to the above, except that it is now necessary to also integrate over the unobserved
component of wages ǫw.
B Proof of Proposition
For notational simplicity we abstract from the explicit conditioning of utility on
observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity and let u(h) ≡ u(c(h),h;X,ǫ).



































32Given our choice of utility transformation function in X and our distributional as-

























































By deﬁning z ≡ t ×
 
h′∈H e−(u(h)−u(h′)) we can once again perform a simple change
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Γ(1 − θ) (A-2)
where the third equality follows directly from the deﬁnition of the Gamma function
Γ(·). Note that this integral will always converge given that we are considering cases















where the constant of integration is easily obtained by considering the case of a
degenerate choice set and directly integrating A-1. This completes our proof of the
Proposition.
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37Table 1: Parameters of FC/WFTC
April 1999 October 1999 June 2000 June 2002
(FC) (WFTC) (WFTC) (WFTC)
Basic Credit 49.80 52.30 53.15 62.50
Child Credit
under 11 15.15 19.85 25.60 26.45
11 to 16 20.90 20.90 25.60 26.45
over 16 25.95 25.95 26.35 27.20
30 hour credit 11.05 11.05 11.25 11.65
Threshold 80.65 90.00 91.45 94.50
































1 (more than 1)
child under 15
Notes: All monetary amounts are in pounds per week and expressed in nominal terms. Minimum
FC/WFTC award is 50p per week in all years above.
38Table 2: Predicted and empirical frequencies, age of youngest child
All 0-4 5-10 11-18
Predicted Empirical Predicted Empirical Predicted Empirical Predicted Empirical
0 hours 0.551 0.550 0.709 0.708 0.491 0.488 0.319 0.320
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
10 hours 0.069 0.068 0.053 0.050 0.080 0.082 0.080 0.081
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
19 hours 0.101 0.121 0.085 0.099 0.114 0.139 0.114 0.130
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009)
26 hours 0.081 0.070 0.056 0.044 0.093 0.084 0.113 0.098
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008)
33 hours 0.092 0.077 0.051 0.042 0.105 0.087 0.157 0.136
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
40 hours 0.106 0.115 0.046 0.058 0.117 0.120 0.217 0.235
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
Take-up 0.766 0.765 0.822 0.788 0.767 0.783 0.709 0.715
rate (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Notes: Empirical frequencies calculated using FRS data with sample selection as detailed in section 5. The discrete points 0, 10, 19, 26, 33 and
40 correspond to the hours ranges 0, 1–15, 16–22, 23–29, 30–36 and 37+ respectively. Empirical take-up rates calculated using reported receipt of
FC/WFTC with entitlement simulated using FORTAX. Predicted frequencies are calculated using FRS data and the maximum likelihood estimates
from table 12. Standard errors are in parentheses, and calculated for the predicted frequencies by sampling 500 times from the distribution of
parameter estimates and conditional on the sample distribution of observables.
3
9Table 3: Predicted and empirical frequencies, 1997-2002
1997 2002
Predicted Empirical Predicted Empirical
0 hours 0.592 0.600 0.507 0.508
(0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013)
10 hours 0.071 0.080 0.069 0.062
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
19 hours 0.092 0.100 0.114 0.140
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
26 hours 0.072 0.052 0.091 0.079
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
33 hours 0.080 0.064 0.103 0.093
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008)
40 hours 0.094 0.104 0.115 0.120
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
Take-up 0.716 0.688 0.817 0.838
rate (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010)
Notes: Empirical frequencies calculated using FRS data with sample selection as detailed in section
5. The discrete points 0, 10, 19, 26, 33 and 40 correspond to the hours ranges 0, 1–15, 16–22, 23–29,
30–36 and 37+ respectively. Empirical take-up rates calculated using reported receipt of FC/WFTC
with entitlement simulated using FORTAX. Predicted frequencies are calculated using FRS data and
the maximum likelihood estimates from table 12. Standard errors are in parentheses, and calculated
for the predicted frequencies by sampling 500 times from the distribution of parameter estimates
and conditional on the sample distribution of observables.
40Table 4: Impact of reforms, 1997-2002
2002 system 1997 system change
0 hours 0.507 0.547 -0.039
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003)
10 hours 0.069 0.072 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
19 hours 0.114 0.098 0.015
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
26 hours 0.091 0.078 0.013
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
33 hours 0.103 0.089 0.014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
40 hours 0.115 0.117 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Take-up 0.817 0.683 0.134
rate (0.008) (0.019) (0.015)
Notes: impact of tax and transfer system reforms on hours of work and take-up simulated using FRS
2002 data by replacing actual 2002 tax systems with the April 1997 tax system. Standard errors
are in parentheses and are calculated by sampling 500 times from the distribution of parameter
estimates and conditional on the sample distribution of observables.
41Table 5: Simulated elasticities, age of youngest child
Weekly 0-4 5-10 11-18
Earnings Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
50 0.168 0.025 0.205 0.085 0.144 0.130
(0.017) (0.003) (0.020) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016)
100 0.128 0.055 0.178 0.177 0.151 0.269
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.030)
150 0.100 0.077 0.155 0.239 0.153 0.387
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.025) (0.008) (0.042)
200 0.067 0.076 0.112 0.231 0.116 0.394
(0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.024) (0.005) (0.041)
250 0.043 0.066 0.074 0.194 0.077 0.340
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.035)
300 0.027 0.051 0.046 0.147 0.045 0.252
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) (0.024)
350 0.016 0.035 0.028 0.102 0.025 0.170
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.015)
400 0.024 0.034 0.039 0.094 0.028 0.140
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.011)
Participation 0.566 0.820 0.720
elasticity (0.047) (0.042) (0.036)
Notes: All elasticities simulated under actual 2002 tax systems with complete take-up of WFTC.
Earnings are in pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices. Participation elasticities
simulated by increasing consumption at all positive hours choices by 1%. Extensive and intensive
earnings elasticities simulated by increasing consumption at the hours point closest to the respective
earnings point. Extensive elasticities measure the increase in the employment rate following a 1%
increase in consumption at the respective level of earnings. Intensive elasticities measure the increase
in the proportion of individuals at each earnings point from any positive hours point following a 1%
increase in consumption at the respective level of earnings. Standard errors are in parentheses, and
calculated by sampling 500 times from the distribution of parameter estimates and conditional on
the sample distribution of observables.
42Table 6: Optimal marginal tax schedules, age of youngest child
Weekly 0-4 5-10 11-18
Earnings θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0
0–50 0.107 0.150 0.241 0.020 0.043 0.120 -0.045 -0.028 0.060
(0.026) (0.021) (0.029) (0.034) (0.023) (0.020) (0.056) (0.040) (0.028)
50–100 0.618 0.486 0.205 0.631 0.470 0.154 0.552 0.369 0.101
(0.045) (0.046) (0.057) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.034)
100–150 0.239 0.177 -0.024 0.325 0.259 0.043 0.407 0.322 0.080
(0.023) (0.025) (0.037) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
150–200 0.424 0.367 0.144 0.513 0.437 0.127 0.565 0.468 0.098
(0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.012) (0.016) (0.034) (0.015) (0.019) (0.040)
200–250 0.444 0.407 0.136 0.523 0.476 0.202 0.582 0.522 0.219
(0.010) (0.012) (0.029) (0.009) (0.012) (0.035) (0.011) (0.013) (0.041)
250–300 0.384 0.338 0.118 0.517 0.461 0.096 0.580 0.507 0.094
(0.015) (0.016) (0.038) (0.011) (0.015) (0.038) (0.014) (0.018) (0.044)
300+ 0.559 0.542 0.343 0.602 0.575 0.298 0.663 0.631 0.335
(0.010) (0.010) (0.032) (0.008) (0.009) (0.040) (0.008) (0.009) (0.044)
Out-of-work 142.545 141.401 133.762 135.548 131.041 108.591 123.733 114.296 79.458
income (1.273) (1.188) (1.270) (1.833) (1.752) (3.200) (3.579) (3.451) (4.651)
Notes: Table presents optimal structure of marginal tax rates and out-of-work income by age of child and under range of distributional taste
parameters θ. All incomes are in pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices. Standard errors are in parentheses and are calculated
by sampling 500 times from the distribution of parameter estimates and conditional on the sample distribution of observables.
4
3Table 7: Social welfare weights under optimal system, age of youngest child
Weekly 0-4 5-10 11-18
Earnings θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0
0 1.226 1.208 1.143 1.493 1.418 1.228 1.701 1.539 1.238
0–50 1.034 0.966 0.856 1.381 1.282 1.076 1.680 1.497 1.174
50–100 0.838 0.837 0.784 1.103 1.092 0.968 1.352 1.284 1.047
100–150 0.643 0.714 0.802 0.886 0.950 0.952 1.119 1.140 1.016
150–200 0.524 0.647 0.851 0.704 0.828 0.969 0.883 0.980 1.015
200–250 0.423 0.563 0.842 0.562 0.707 0.929 0.705 0.834 0.971
250–300 0.335 0.483 0.883 0.440 0.595 0.912 0.549 0.702 0.948
300+ 0.202 0.331 0.775 0.253 0.397 0.860 0.323 0.479 0.905
Notes: Table presents social welfare weights under optimal structure of marginal tax rates and out-of-work income by age of child and under range
of distributional taste parameters θ as presented in Table 6. All incomes are in pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices. Social
weights are normalized so that the sum of weights multiplied by earnings density under optimal system is equal to unity.
4
4Table 8: Optimal marginal tax schedules, robustness exercise
Weekly 0-4 5-10 11-18
Earnings Utility 1 Utility 2 Utility 3 Utility 1 Utility 2 Utility 3 Utility 1 Utility 2 Utility 3
0–50 0.150 0.181 0.125 0.043 0.019 0.015 -0.028 0.006 0.014
(0.021) (0.029) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.030) (0.040) (0.063) (0.060)
50–100 0.486 0.596 0.335 0.470 0.439 0.257 0.369 0.327 0.247
(0.046) (0.062) (0.044) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.093) (0.063)
100–150 0.177 0.170 0.261 0.259 0.220 0.271 0.322 0.298 0.309
(0.025) (0.055) (0.015) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.064) (0.027)
150–200 0.367 0.362 0.361 0.437 0.413 0.374 0.468 0.453 0.432
(0.016) (0.027) (0.022) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.069) (0.023)
200–250 0.407 0.411 0.410 0.476 0.461 0.452 0.522 0.510 0.512
(0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.070) (0.020)
250–300 0.338 0.353 0.353 0.461 0.447 0.416 0.507 0.495 0.477
(0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.020)
300+ 0.542 0.564 0.557 0.575 0.570 0.583 0.631 0.622 0.646
(0.010) (0.014) (0.025) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020)
Out-of-work 141.401 141.276 140.637 131.041 129.398 125.817 114.296 113.329 111.085
income (1.188) (1.407) (1.217) (1.752) (1.954) (2.292) (3.451) (6.336) (4.966)
Notes: Table presents optimal structure of marginal tax rates and out-of-work income by age of child and range of utility function speciﬁcations
(utility 1, utility 2, and utility 3 – see section 6 for details) with θ = −0.2. All incomes are in pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002
prices. Standard errors are in parentheses and are calculated by sampling 500 times from the distribution of parameter estimates and conditional
on the sample distribution of observables.
4
5Table 9: Quantifying the welfare gain of hours rules
19 hours optimal hours
θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0 θ = −0.4 θ = −0.2 θ = 0.0
0–4 0.250 0.213 0.05 0.782 0.854 0.956
(0.2%) (0.2%) (0.0%) (0.7%) (0.7%) (0.8%)
5–10 1.118 0.884 0.130 2.760 2.711 1.476
(1.3%) (1.0%) (0.2%) (3.2%) (3.2%) (1.7%)
11–18 1.592 1.083 0.08 5.016 4.471 1.720
(3.0%) (2.1%) (0.2%) (9.5%) (8.5%) (3.3%)
Notes: Table shows the additional expenditure requirement per person by age of child and under
range of distributional taste parameters θ that is necessary to achieve the same level of social welfare
as under the respective hours rules with a schedule that varies only with earnings. All incomes are
in pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices. Figures in parentheses correspond to
the proportional increase in required expenditure.
46Table 10: The eﬀect of random measurement error on the optimal hours bonus
Standard 0–4 5–10 11–18
Deviation bonus hours welfare bonus hours welfare bonus hours welfare
0 39.54 33 0.7% 51.02 33 3.2% 60.42 33 8.5%
2 37.90 33 0.7% 49.42 33 3.0% 58.87 33 8.2%
4 33.87 33 0.6% 43.38 33 2.5% 52.07 33 6.9%
6 29.13 33 0.5% 36.99 33 2.0% 43.52 33 5.4%
8 23.88 33 0.3% 29.91 33 1.4% 33.42 33 3.7%
10 19.24 33 0.3% 23.83 33 1.1% 30.44 26 2.8%
12 15.06 33 0.2% 20.13 26 0.8% 24.26 26 2.1%
14 13.07 33 0.1% 17.49 26 0.6% 20.76 26 1.7%
16 11.70 26 0.1% 15.73 26 0.6% 18.24 26 1.4%
Notes: Table shows how the optimal placement and size of hours contingent payments varies with random hours measurement error by age of
youngest child and with θ = −0.2. Standard Deviation refers to the standard deviation of the additive independent normally distributed hours
measurement error term. The columns “welfare” refer to the percentage increase in required expenditure to achieve the same level of social welfare
compared to when no hours conditioning is performed. All incomes are in pounds per week and are expressed in April 2002 prices.
4
7Table 11: The eﬀect of hours misreporting on the optimal hours bonus
Misreporting 0–4 5–10 11–18
Cost bonus hours welfare bonus hours welfare bonus hours welfare
∞ 39.54 33 0.7% 51.02 33 3.2% 60.42 33 8.5%
0.64 39.54 33 0.7% 51.01 33 3.2% 60.41 33 8.5%
0.32 38.54 33 0.7% 49.03 33 3.1% 57.92 33 8.4%
0.16 29.85 33 0.6% 34.12 33 2.6% 41.38 33 7.0%
0.08 17.35 33 0.4% 19.50 33 1.7% 23.44 33 4.6%
0.04 8.58 33 0.2% 11.04 33 1.0% 12.14 33 2.6%
0.02 5.30 33 0.1% 6.16 33 0.6% 6.73 33 1.5%
0.01 2.75 33 0.1% 3.22 33 0.3% 3.77 33 0.8%
Notes: Table shows how the optimal placement and size of hours contingent payments varies with the utility cost of hours misreporting by age of
youngest child and with θ = −0.2. “Misreporting Cost” refers to the additive utility cost associated with misreporting, and is measured per-hour
overstated and relative to standard deviation of the state speciﬁc error ε. The columns “welfare” refer to the percentage increase in required
expenditure to achieve the same level of social welfare compared to when no hours conditioning is performed. All incomes are in pounds per week
and are expressed in April 2002 prices.
4
8Table 12: Simulated maximum likelihood estimation results
Preference parameters
constant youngest youngest number of age compuslory non-white London WFTC year
child 0-4 child 5-10 children-1 schooling period 2000
αy 1.566 -0.104 -0.029 -0.010 -0.010 -0.027 – – – –
(0.131) (0.119) (0.108) (0.031) (0.005) (0.083) – – – –
αl 2.781 0.030 0.024 0.057 -0.047 -(0.407) – – – –
(0.187) (0.168) (0.157) (0.044) (0.007) (0.085) – – – –
αyl 4.112 7.578 3.587 – – – – – – –
(1.630) (2.065) (1.849) – – – – – – –
θy 0.302 – – – – – – – – –
(0.111) – – – – – – – – –
θl 2.813 – – – – – – – – –
(0.816) – – – – – – – – –
αf 0.284 0.151 0.043 0.044 0.006 0.081 -0.035 0.228 – –
(0.083) (0.084) (0.068) (0.032) (0.005) (0.063) (0.053) (0.046) – –
η 0.760 – – – 0.028 -0.058 0.328 – -0.475 0.394





1 child 1 child 1 child 2 children 2 children 2 children
youngest age 0-4 youngest age 5-10 youngest age 11-18 youngest age 0-4 youngest age 5-10 youngest age 11-18
γc 4.481 -7.767 -27.833 5.035 -25.872 -58.522
(2.041) (1.494) (5.354) (3.646) (3.319) (11.016)
βc 0.701 0.672 0.309 1.163 1.308 0.639
(0.066) (0.049) (0.157) (0.133) (0.115) (0.323)
σc 13.171 11.783 24.814 26.944 27.420 42.667
(0.466) (0.312) (2.274) (0.905) (0.868) (3.757)
Pr(p1
cc) 0.181 0.172 0.153 0.159 0.133 0.178
(0.019) (0.018) (0.036) (0.019) (0.016) (0.049)
Pr(p2
cc) 0.205 0.179 – 0.194 0.146 –
(0.021) (0.019) – (0.023) (0.018) –
Pr(p3
cc) 0.240 0.194 – 0.267 0.164 –
(0.023) (0.020) – (0.028) (0.020) –
p0
cc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p1
cc 0.972 0.810 1.820 0.541 0.570 1.658
p2
cc 2.172 1.594 – 1.555 1.474 –
p3
cc 3.436 2.576 – 2.942 2.474 –
Wage equation
constant education age age squared London non-white 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 σw
0.250 0.081 0.052 -0.054 0.191 -0.030 -0.013 0.028 0.130 0.138 0.146 0.406
0.043 (0.002) (0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.005)
Notes: All parameters estimated simultaneously by simulated maximum likelihood, using FRS data and with sample selection as detailed in section
5. Incomes are expressed in hundreds of pounds per week in April 2002 prices. Age and age squared are deﬁned in terms of deviations from the
median value; age squared is divided by one hundred. Compulsory schooling is equal to 1 if the individual completed school at age 16 or above.
Education measures years of education completed. London is equal to one if resident in the Greater London area. WFTC period is equal to one















































































(f) Single women, 2002
Figure 1: Female hours of work by survey year. Figure shows the distribution of usual
hours of work for women by year and presence of children. Sample is restricted to
women aged 18–45. Calculated using UK Labour Force Survey data (for 1991) and
UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey data (1995 and 2002). Horizontal axes measure
weekly hours of work; the vertical line indicates the minimum hours eligibility.
























Figure 2: Tax and transfer system interactions. Figure shows interaction of tax and
transfer system under April 2002 system for a lone parent with a single child aged 5,
average band C council tax, £40 per week housing costs, and no childcare costs. All































































(c) Youngest child aged 11–18
Figure 3: Optimal tax schedules with hours bonuses. All schedules are calculated
with θ = −0.2 and assuming an hourly wage of £6. All incomes are measured in




























































(c) Youngest child aged 11–18
Figure 4: Hours distributions under optimal schedules. Hours distributions are cal-
culated under the respective optimal tax systems with θ = −0.2. Horizontal axis
measures hours of work per week.
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